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Section 1: Topic of Interest
The private equity and venture capital (PE/VC) industries have grown tremendously over
the past few decades. However, due to the relatively recent development of the industry and the
private nature of these investments, there have been relatively few studies addressing the
structural and organizational factors that have led to a larger and more efficient PE/VC industry.
While this paper will give a general overview of the PE/VC industries and the organizational
characteristics of PE/VC funds, I am particularly interested in determining the key characteristics
of limited partnership contracts that govern the relationship between the general partners (GPs)
who manage PE/VC funds and the limited partners (LPs) who invest capital in these funds. Due
to potential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard between the GPs and the LPs, the
compensation structure and covenants set out in contracts are key factors by which investors are
able to screen and monitor PE/VC professionals. If these contracts can be appropriately
designed to align the GP’s incentives with those of the investors, then the PE/VC industry will
continue to be an attractive market for long-term, high-reward investments. This paper will
address the various principal-agent problems that arise in PE/VC investing and will seek to
provide a broad model that characterizes the key explanatory variables for GP compensation and
covenant levels.
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Section 2: Overview of the PE/VC Industry
From the first modern VC firm, American Research and Development (1946), organized
as a publicly traded closed-end fund, to the first VC limited partnership, Draper, Gaither, and
Anderson (1958) to the present day, the PE/VC industry has undergone significant structural
change which has led to a dramatic increase in the amount of committed capital flowing into the
industry and the number of PE/VC funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). During the 1980s and
1990s, the private equity market experienced tremendous growth, significantly outpacing the
growth in the public equity and debt markets and the private placement debt market (Fenn,
Liang, and Prowse, 1997). From 1980 to 1995, for example, the total amount of private equity
capital under management increased from under $5bn to over $175bn, which represents over a
25% compounded annual growth rate (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse, 1997). Not surprisingly then,
the capital committed to the private equity industry often exceeded the financing raised through
initial public offerings and gross high-yield corporate bond issuances (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse,
1997).
There were three regulatory and structural changes fueling the unprecedented growth in
capital committed to PE/VC funds and helping to make the PE/VC industry the fastest growing
corporate finance market. First, in 1979 there was an amendment to the “prudent man” rule
governing the types of investments allowable for pension funds. Prior to this amendment, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, 1974) placed restrictions on institutional
investors that limited them from investing substantial amounts in venture, non-venture, and other
high risk asset classes (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
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The “prudent man” rule amendment, however, permitted pension funds to make
significant investments in venture capital and other high-risk assets. As a direct result of this
amendment, pension funds became the single largest contributor to the venture capital industry.
As of year-end 1996, for example, the two largest contributors to the private equity market were
public pension funds and corporate pension funds, which contributed $39.5bn and $34.7bn,
respectively, of the total $176.3bn private equity outstanding (See Exhibit 1 for a detailed
breakdown of the contributions made by different players). In addition, a study showed that
while only 11% of the three major investor groups (pension funds, endowments, and
foundations) committed capital to private equity funds in 1975, approximately 56% of these
same investor groups contributed capital to the private equity industry in 1995. Thus, the rapid
growth in the private equity market has been driven significantly by the regulatory changes to the
“prudent man” rule.
The second contributing factor to the growth in private equity was due to structural
changes in the manner in which capital was contributed by investors to private equity funds.
Specifically, through the 1970s and 1980s, the use of investment advisors, or gatekeepers, by
institutional investors became more prevalent and these agents helped to monitor VC funds and
advise investors on choosing appropriate VC funds in which to invest (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). These gatekeepers would pool capital from their many clients in order to gain more
bargaining power when contracting with the private equity fund managers, whose fundraising
costs would be significantly lowered by these gatekeepers. Thus, the rise of gatekeepers was an
organizational innovation that helped the private equity market function more efficiently, and by
the 1990s, roughly 1/3 of pension fund commitments came through the use of an investment
advisor (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).

5

Third, and perhaps most important, was the development and use of the limited
partnership structure as the primary financial intermediary between the investors, or limited
partners (LPs) and the private equity fund managers, the general partners (GPs)1. While only
accounting for 40% of the venture pool in 1980, the limited partnership organizational structure
comprised over 80% of the VC pool of capital by 1992 (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Similar to
the increased use of investment advisors as lubricants for the private equity machine, the
organizational innovations provided by the limited partnership structure has allowed for the
mitigation of principal-agent problems prevalent between investors and entrepreneurs (See
Exhibit 2 for an overview of the growth of the limited partnership structure). The next section
will discuss the potential principal-agent relationships that can arise in the PE/VC industries,
followed by an overview of the limited partnership structure.
Section 2.1: Principal-Agent Issues within PE/VC Settings
A fertile ground for studying principal-agent issues is within the PE/VC industries, where
information asymmetry is rampant between the investors and entrepreneurs looking for start-up
capital. Private equity/venture capital is a unique and expensive source of financing sought by
companies that do not have access to traditional bank loans or capital market financing due to
their high risk, sometimes unproven track records, and severe information problems presented to
investors.

Investments in these firms require intensive pre-investment due diligence, post-

investment monitoring, and a long time horizon before returns can be realized, which further
inhibits the ability of these firms to raise capital through traditional outlets such as public
security offerings. Over time, however, the PE/VC industry has developed mechanisms to
mitigate the various information asymmetry problems inherent in this industry in an attempt to
1

Here it should be noted that the term “GP” will refer the entire PE/VC organization even though often there are
several GPs that manage the PE/VC fund together.
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minimize the agency loss – the potential loss that arises due to imperfect information between
principals and agents.
The two primary informational problems within the principal-agent framework are
known as hidden information, or asymmetric information, and hidden action, or moral hazard
(Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). These agency problems are prevalent in the PE/VC industry.
Hidden information problems exist when an agent is privy to something that the principal has not
observed. This information would influence how the principal values the agent’s actions. The
agent then uses this superior information when making business decisions, but the principal is
not aware of whether or not the agent used the hidden information in the best interest of the
principal. Rather, the principal only knows that the agent used the information in his own best
interest. In the PE/VC industry, the entrepreneur (agent) may have better information than the
investor (principal) regarding the prospects of his business, technology, and managerial skills.
Consequently, it is in the best interest of the entrepreneur, seeking the highest valuation possible,
to highlight the positives while downplaying the negatives of his enterprise.

This hidden

information is especially prevalent in the venture capital industry, where entrepreneurs may not
have a proven track record and are not required to issue public financial statements.
Hidden action problems can arise throughout the normal operation of the business, when
the investor (principal) cannot directly observe the effort levels exerted by the entrepreneur
(agent). These entrepreneurs, if not appropriately incentivized by the investors, can take actions
that give themselves private benefits at the expense of the investors; for example, if the
entrepreneur did not retain an adequate equity stake in the firm, he may shirk and invest in perks
rather than productive investments.
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In order to mitigate these hidden information and hidden action problems, the limited
partnership organizational structure has become the vehicle of choice for the majority of private
equity investments. On one hand, the managers of these private equity partnerships have the
requisite time and expertise necessary to conduct due diligence in selecting investments and
monitoring the start-up funds following investment. Surely, it would be inefficient for each
investor to conduct this time intensive diligence and monitoring because 1) there would be too
much overlap in the monitoring conducted by the investors, or 2) some investors would free-ride
off the monitoring services of others (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Thus, it is often more
efficient to allow the experienced private equity fund managers to solely engage in contracting
and monitoring activities.

In addition to the diligence and monitoring costs, institutional

investors do not invest in private equity because they may not reach the critical mass necessary
to achieve expertise in making these investments, and they could potentially lose the benefits of
diversification that comes with investing through private equity funds, each holding a portfolio
of firms (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Exhibit 3 outlines the basic relationship between the various participants in the private
equity market and the organizational and contractual mechanisms utilized to align their
incentives. Here, it should be noted that while the limited partnership structure is created as an
intermediary to reduce the agency problems between the investor and entrepreneur, the limited
partnership itself creates an agency relationship between the investor (principal) and the fund
managers (agents). The focus of this research paper will be on the agency relationship created
by the limited partnership structure between the GPs and the LPs.
The agency relationship between the LPs (principals) and the GPs (agents) can
potentially lead to both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. One of the primary
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adverse selection problems arises since the GPs may have better information regarding their
talent or skill level in investing funds than do the LPs. If there were no profit sharing rule, then it
would be more difficult for the LP to choose between two competing PE/VC organizations
raising their first fund. With the profit sharing, the LPs can screen between those GPs that have
a lot of confidence in their abilities and those who are not willing to take the majority of their
compensation in carried interest. In addition, the profit sharing rule allows the LP to monitor the
GP throughout the life of the fund. Since the GP receives the bulk of his compensation through
the carried interest, he will be continually motivated to exert appropriate effort levels rather than
shirking. Thus, the use of pay-for-performance incentives in typical PE/VC partnerships helps to
alleviate the hidden information and hidden action problems that could potentially arise over the
life of the partnership.
Likewise, various covenants are included in limited partnership agreements to mitigate
the information asymmetry between the LPs and the GPs. For example, covenants may limit the
amount a PE/VC fund can invest in the organization’s earlier funds. The information on earlier
funds’ investments may not be publicly available, and venture capitalists may seek to invest
more money in an unprofitable investment made by their earlier fund in the hopes of salvaging a
failing investment.

Since the LPs do not have as much information on these issues, this

particular covenant curbs the hidden information problem.
In addition, one of the most common moral hazard problems between the LP (principal)
and GP (agent) is monitoring the effort level exerted by the agent. In PE/VC funds, the GPs
actively manage the fund’s activities, but the LPs who commit capital cannot perfectly observe
the effort levels exerted by the GPs. Since the effort levels are correlated with the outcome, or
profitability of the fund, the LPs must incentivize the GPs to exert appropriate effort levels in
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structuring and monitoring investments in order to maximize the LP’s own returns. However, if
GP compensation were a fixed amount, then GPs would shirk and exert the minimum effort level
required to remain employed and retain the fixed salary. To address this moral hazard problem,
LPs typically share profits with GPs to give them incentives to create the most value for the fund.
In addition, there are various covenants included in limited partnership agreements that
specifically limit the activities of the GPs. For example, covenants may limit the amount of
personal funds a GP can invest in a single firm, to ensure proper effort levels are exerted across
all investments; other covenants restrict the different asset classes and amounts of capital that
GPs can invest in order to reduce the level of risk chosen by the GP. Thus, contractual covenants
and compensation schemes are two primary ways that the limited partnership structure addresses
adverse selection and moral hazard problems between investors and the PE/VC fund managers.
For the reasons outlined above, the limited partnership has become an intermediary
between the investor and the entrepreneur that allows for the private equity market to function
more efficiently. The focus of this research paper will be on the extent to which the contractual
features of the limited partnership structure, specifically performance incentives and direct
means of control, help to align the interests of the investor (LP) who contributes capital and the
fund manager (GP) who selects, structures, and monitors investments (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). The next section will give a general overview of the limited partnership structure and
common contractual features embedded into the limited partnership agreement.
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Section 3: Overview of the Limited Partnership Structure
As mentioned earlier, the most widespread organizational structure used in PE/VC
investing is the limited partnership, through which limited partners (LPs) passively invest money
in funds which are actively managed by general partners (GPs). In order to maintain their
limited liability status, the LPs cannot participate in the day-to-day decision-making processes of
the funds; hence, the LPs are not able to actively monitor the GP’s actions (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). In the PE/VC industry, the agents are the GPs who have practically full information over
the fund’s activities, performance, and their own effort levels exerted. In order to protect the
interests of the LPs, the limited partnership agreements try to maximize efficiency and minimize
the informational asymmetries between LPs and GPs through contractual (compensation and
covenant) features.
Typical PE/VC Limited Partnerships
The typical PE/VC limited partnership agreement is a long-term commitment, spanning a
period of 10-13 years with terms renegotiated very rarely (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). During
the first three to five years of the fund’s life, the GPs conduct extensive due diligence on
potential investments and execute investments in chosen portfolio firms. Following majoritystake investments, the GPs secure board and voting rights and actively help manage their
portfolio firms.

GPs typically add value through their industry and financial management

expertise and through their experience in hiring key management personnel, dealing with
suppliers, and overseeing daily operations (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).

Once most of the

committed capital is put to work in portfolio firms, GPs generally begin the fundraising process
for another fund in order to continue to make investments in the market. However, in the later
years of the fund’s life, the GPs must return capital and profits to their LPs, and thus, they look

11

for potential exits for their portfolio firms. Common exit strategies can include a private sale to a
third party, a recapitalization, or an initial public offering (IPO) which generally provides the
bulk of returns for PE/VC funds. The venture capital cycle beginning with fundraising, followed
by GPs structuring and monitoring investments, and concluding with exiting investments occurs
continually so long as there is enough demand for the services that the PE/VC GPs provide.
The limited partnership structure incorporates two key features to align the incentives of the
GPs with those of the LPs throughout this PE/VC cycle: 1) Performance Incentives and 2) Direct
Means of Control (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Exhibit 4 gives an overview of the common
oversight mechanisms between the various parties in PE/VC transactions.
Section 3.1: Performance Incentives
The two main types of performance incentives for the GPs are reputation and
compensation. Developing a sound reputation is critical in the PE/VC industry in which there
are a relatively few number of key players who interact repeatedly (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).
Due to the limited lifetime of the limited partnership structure, a fund must develop a proven
track record in order to raise additional funds in the future and remain in the PE/VC business.
Reputation may also allow GPs to raise larger funds, to negotiate higher profit sharing
percentages, and to gain access to better deals.
In addition to developing a good reputation with the investment community, GPs are very
concerned with their compensation structure, which has a fixed component and variable
component (Covitz and Liang, 2002). The GPs generally receive a fixed annual payment, or
management fee, of roughly 1.5-2.5% of the fund’s total committed capital in order to cover dayto-day operations and monitoring costs of the portfolio companies. The bulk of the GP’s
compensation, however, typically comes in the form of a variable payment, or carried interest, in
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which the GP shares a certain percentage, usually 20%, of the profits of the fund after the initial
capital is returned to the LPs. This performance-based pay reduces hidden action problems by
giving GPs an incentive to exert appropriate effort levels in managing the fund. The carried
interest can also help to limit excessive risk taking, or “swinging for the fences” which could
result in lower overall profits for the fund and thus lower GP carry (Covitz and Liang, 2002).
The carried interest induces GPs to make responsible investments in order to first return capital
to their investors because then only will they share in any profits. At the same time, however,
the typical carried interest structure can be viewed as a fraction of a call on the value of the fund.
From this perspective, the performance-based pay could induce GPs to increase the riskiness of
their investments in order to increase the value of their call option. The true affect of this carried
interest feature will only be borne out through time, but here it will suffice to say that the
preferred return can have different implications for its use in different situations.
In addition, certain non-venture funds, and to a lesser extent venture funds, have the
added provision that GPs must meet some minimum hurdle-rate or achieve a “preferred return”
before taking their 20% share of the profits. The most common preferred return, or hurdle rate,
is 8% for both venture and non-venture funds. The 8% represents the annual compounded return
that GPs must provide for their investors, over and above returning their initial capital, before
beginning to share in the upside profits of the fund.
While the payoff structure for carried interest without preferred return provisions is
similar to a fraction of a call option on the total value of the fund’s capital, the payoff diagram
for carried interest with preferred returns is significantly different from a call option (See Exhibit
5 for typical payoff diagrams for carried interest and preferred returns). Under preferred returns,
the GP must first return to investors their total invested capital including growth at the preferred
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return rate. Then, the GPs are entitled to 100% of the profits until it catches up to its carried
interest percent on the total committed capital; any incremental revenue above this amount is
split between the GP and LP according to the carried interest amount (Covitz and Liang, 2002).
Since the probability that the GP begins sharing in the profits is reduced by preferred return
provisions, the expected and actual compensation received by GPs may be much lower than
without these provisions.
Section 3.2: Direct Means of Control
While carried interest and preferred returns represent performance-based metrics utilized
by limited partnerships to align the incentives of the LPs and GPs, there are also direct means of
control that influence and restrict the actions of the GPs. Thus, in some cases, the largest LPs are
able to sit on advisory boards for the limited partnership. While these advisory boards cannot
take an active role in the management of the fund’s resources, the board can provide an advisory
and oversight role when key decisions are made for the fund – such as the hiring or firing of a
GP. More commonly, however, LPs are able to add a variety of covenants that control the
actions of the GPs. These restrictive covenants can be viewed as a cost to the GPs of entering a
partnership agreement or conversely, an added perk for LPs that enter into partnerships.
Although the power and extent to which advisory boards are used is fairly limited, it is
common for these partnership agreements to include covenants which protect the interests of the
investors (LPs) and help to ensure that proper actions are taken by the GPs. Here, it should be
noted that these additional information problems could potentially be mitigated by variations in
compensation structures, such as lower fixed pay and higher carried interest. However, we do
not observe drastic changes to compensation structures in practice because this would attract
unwanted attention from regulators and investors. For example, in a sample of over 400 venture
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capital partnerships whose first fund closed between January 1978 and December 1992,
Gompers observes that 81% of the funds had carried interest figures ranging from 20-21%,
which seems quite homogenous (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
This apparent clustering may indicate that while carried interest remains fairly stable
across funds, variations in control may primarily come through the addition or subtraction of
covenants which are a much less obvious way to adjust for particular informational asymmetries
that exist within the PE/VC industry. Thus, Gompers (1999) classifies 14 common covenants
into three functional groups: those related to overall fund management, those governing the
activities of GPs, and those restricting the type of investments made by the VC fund. Since
carried interest shows little variation, covenants may be a key factor in the total benefits received
by GPs since covenants serve as a restriction on GPs time, action, and compensation.
Gompers (1999) analyzes a broad sample of 140 partnership agreements and identifies
the key covenant provisions that are prevalent in greater than 5% but less than 95% of the total
number of covenants. There were 14 different covenant types that fit this criterion, and each was
categorized into one of three groups depending on whether the covenant governed 1) the overall
management of the fund, 2) the activities of the GP, or 3) the permissible types of investments
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
The first category involves covenants that control the overall management of the fund.
An example of such a covenant would be to limit the dollar amount invested in any one firm.
Since GPs may be inclined to bail out faltering investments through additional follow-on
funding, this covenant reduces the potential agency costs between GP and LP. Another way to
look at the agency problem is to consider the GP as holding a call option on the value of the
fund; all else equal, the GP would like to increase the variance of the fund by investing in only a
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few firms. Hence, this particular covenant limits the GP’s ability to take on excessive risk.
Using the same options framework, the GP would be able to increase the variance of the funds’
returns by taking on debt or guaranteeing the debt of portfolio firms. Consequently, LPs may
contract for a covenant that limits the GPs ability to borrow additional funds. Other covenants
that fall into this category include restrictions on coinvesting with earlier or later funds or
reinvesting profits of the fund into firms requiring additional capital. These covenants make
specific actions prohibitively unlikely by mandating approval from an advisory board or a
supermajority vote (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
The second broad class of covenants includes those associated with restricting specific
activities of the GPs. Since the GP’s effort is unobservable to the LP, yet highly correlated with
fund performance, LPs favor covenants that prevent GPs from shirking or focusing on only
certain portfolio firms. Thus, limited partnerships agreements can include covenants that limit
the GP’s ability to invest personal funds in portfolio firms. If a GP invests a large sum in one
portfolio fund, for example, he would be motivated to put more effort into monitoring that one
investment perhaps at the expense of other portfolio firms. Thus, the LP may require the GP to
invest equally across all investments, if allowing them to invest any money at all.
In addition, to keep GP effort levels high it is critical that GPs do not sell off their interest
in the profits of the fund to a third party. Even though only a weak and illiquid market exists for
GP interests, a covenant preventing this type of GP activity is critical in keeping GP effort level
high. Other covenants in this group may restrict the GP’s ability to participate in outside
activities, such as sitting on the advisory boards for the community, since this may reduce the
time available for GPs to add value to their investments. Similarly, the GP may be restricted
from raising additional funds, which is a time consuming process, before all of the capital of the
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current fund is invested. Finally, GPs may try to reduce their effort levels or increase the scope
of their fund by bringing on less experienced GPs. However, this would reduce fund returns for
the LPs, and thus, they try to restrict the ability of the GP to hire additional personnel to manage
a given fund.
The third general category of covenants restricts the permissible types of investments that
can be made by the GPs. These covenants are primarily motivated by the fact that compensation
levels for PE/VC professionals are much higher relative to typical money managers and
investment manager. While the typical money manager investing in public securities receives an
annual fee of a mere .5% of asset, the typical PE/VC GP will receive a management fee of 2%
along with carried interest of 20% (Covitz and Liang, 2002). Thus, it would not be efficient for
LPs to compensate GPs at such high levels if GPs merely invested in public securities. Thus,
LPs typically specify the different types of asset classes and the allowable percentage of total
capital that can be dedicated to each asset class. Another agency conflict can arise if the GP
wishes to accumulate private benefits from investing LP money in markets that the GP has no
prior experience in the hopes of gaining experience. With this additional experience, the GP will
be able to raise more and larger funds focusing on other industries; this was a concern in the
1980s when many venture capitalists began investing in leveraged buyouts in the hopes of
gaining this additional experience. All else equal, however, the LP would like to limit these
actions that may reduce the expected value of their fund (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
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Section 4: Principal-Agent Framework
Now that we have explored the basic structure of the PE/VC industry and the common
contractual features of the limited partnership organization, we will take a closer look at the
principal-agent relationship that can arise between the investor (LP) and the fund manager
(GP). We will first evaluate the general principal-agent relationship and then discuss 4 models
which we will use to measure the time-series and cross-sectional variations in contracting
between the GPs and LPs. The learning and signaling models help to explain the differences
over time in compensation and covenant levels, while the supply-demand and costly contracting
models help to explain differences in compensation and covenant levels across PE/VC funds.
The general principal-agent relationship is prevalent in many business settings and
everyday life. Generally, when one individual, the principal, depends on the actions of another
individual, the agent, an agency relationship exists. Thus, the patient is the principal and the
doctor the agent, and corporate managers are the agents, the shareholders their principals.
Within this agency framework, the agent must choose an action from a number of alternative
possibilities knowing that this action affects the welfare of both the principal and the agent. An
added characteristic is that the principal generally determines the payoff rules before the agent
chooses an effort level and undertakes a specific action. While the agent’s action or effort level
is not directly observable by the principal, the outcome of the agent’s action is discernible.
However, the outcome is only partially driven by the agent’s chosen effort and action since the
outcome may be influenced by some exogenous random variable. If the action were completely
dependent on the agent’s action, then the principal would be able to determine with certainty the
agent’s action once the outcome is observed.
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The central problem arises in agency relationships whenever the principal cannot
costlessy monitor the agent’s information and effort level.

While the agent has better

information about the specific nature of his task, the principal has a better idea of what he wants
accomplished. Due to this information asymmetry, the interests of both the principal and agent
may not be aligned. Thus, the real-world firm performs less efficiently than if there were perfect
and costless information shared between principal and agent, and this reduction in efficiency is
known as agency loss (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). Over time, principals and agents have
created mechanisms to minimize this agency loss through contractual agreements that help
principals to monitor and to provide proper incentives for agents.
There are four different principal-agent models that will be used to analyze the PE/VC
limited partnership contracts and the key compensation schemes for GPs. The first two models,
the Learning Model and the Signaling Model, deal primarily with time series differences in GP
contract features; the second two models, the Costly Contracting Model and the Supply-Demand
Model, will help to explain cross-sectional variations in limited partnership contracts. Each of
these models makes predictions regarding the actions of the principal and agent when contracting
and the resulting effect on GP (agent) compensation.
Section 4.1: Learning Model
The learning model assumes that neither the venture capitalist nor the investor knows the
ability of the venture capitalist when raising a first fund (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). This is not
unlikely since GPs may have been hired from various professions, such as academia or industry,
which may require different skill sets from those required for successful private equity investing.
The fund’s return is then a function of the GP’s ability to select and monitor investments, the
GPs effort, and some random noise. While the LPs cannot directly observe the GP’s effort level,
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the LP can determine the general quality of the GP from analyzing the fund’s performance,
which will be positively correlated with GP effort and ability. Thus, investors in the second fund
will have better information about GP quality due to verifiable information about returns from
the GP’s first fund returns.
Section 4.2: Signaling Model
Unlike the learning model which assumes symmetric information (insofar as neither the
GP nor the LP knows the ability of the GP in the first period), the signaling model assumes that
the GP and investor have asymmetric information regarding the skill level of the GP when
raising an initial fund (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Specifically, the signaling model assumes
that the GP has better information regarding his skill level than the investor in the first period.
To differentiate themselves, the high-ability GPs will attempt to signal their superior capabilities
by accepting more risky, variable compensation at the expense of more stable, fixed
compensation. Even low-ability GPs will attempt to signal that they are of high-ability by
accepting higher variable compensation at the expense of fixed compensation. This model
predicts that the second fund’s carried interest will be the same for both high- and low-ability
GPs, but the second fund’s compensation will differ in the fixed management fees charged. The
more experienced GPs will require higher fixed fees as a form of insurance, which the lower
quality GPs will not be able to negotiate (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Section 4.3: Costly Contracting Model
The basic premise of the Costly Contracting model is that negotiating contracts between
LPs and GPs is costly and that renegotiation of contracts is prohibitively expensive (Gompers
and Lerner, 1999). Thus, when establishing a contract that will serve for the fund’s entire life,
GPs and LPs must weigh the potential benefits of including a provision into the contract against
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the costs of having that feature included. For example, the benefits of adding covenants that
restrict the behavior of GPs must be weighed against the costs of monitoring behavior based on
the covenant and the extra time and resources used in adding that covenant to the contract. This
theory predicts that an LP will be more likely to add contractual features that restrain GP action
when there are either more benefits associated with adding that feature or fewer costs associated
with monitoring it. The different costs and benefits associated with funds of different size, age,
reputation, and industry focus lead to cross-sectional variations in limited partnership contracts.
Section 4.4: Supply-Demand Model
A second model that seeks to explain cross-sectional variation in limited partnership
contract features is the Supply-Demand model (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). The premise of this
theory is that the supply of experienced PE/VC services is relatively fixed in the short-run. This
is because PE/VC funds generally raise funds every 3-5 years once their initial fund’s capital has
been fully invested (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Since it takes a long time to develop expertise
in PE/VC investing, the number of new, experienced entrants into the PE/VC industry is limited
in the short run as well. Also, because PE/VC funds are often highly specialized by size,
industry focus, stage of investment, and reputation, they are imperfect substitutes for each other,
which further limits the supply of experienced PE/VC professionals in the short-run. Holding
the supply of PE/VC funds fixed, an increase in demand for PE/VC services, measured by either
the number of entrepreneurs looking for start-up capital or the number of institutional investors
looking to invest, will cause an increase in the price charged to an LP to buy into a limited
partnership agreement. In addition, size and age characteristics of PE/VC funds can be a proxy
for reputation and skill of the GPs. Since more reputable funds will be in more demand, the
Supply-Demand model predicts that the GPs of these funds will have more bargaining power
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relative to the LPs. Consequently, the GPs of older and larger funds will be able to negotiate
more favorable contracts than those at less reputable funds.

Section 5: Empirical Findings
Having analyzed the structure and shape of the PE/VC industry and having introduced
various principal-agent models to help explain variations in limited partnership contracts, the
focus of the paper will now turn to analyzing empirical results from past literature. Specifically,
this research paper will focus on the following contractual features: 1) Carried Interest, 2)
Preferred Returns, and 3) Covenants. Each of these features will be analyzed from both a
theoretical and empirical perspective in the following sections.
Section 5.1: Carried Interest
Since most limited partnership agreements do not afford the same oversight mechanisms
to discipline managers as corporations offer, such as corporate boards and the market for
corporate control, the compensation structure in partnership agreements is a critical way in which
the incentives of the GP are aligned with those of the LP (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Moreover, unlike typical executive employment contracts, the compensations scheme for GPs is
rarely renegotiated over the course of the limited partnership’s 10 year life. Thus, the carried
interest feature, which comprises the bulk of GP compensation, is a critical feature of limited
partnership agreements.

Even though Gompers (1999) finds the typical carried interest

percentage to be quite homogeneous, with 81% of funds in his sample charging between 20-21%
carry, there are still distinct differences across funds as the carried interest percentage ranges
from .7% to 45% in his sample (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). There are two theoretical models,
the learning model and signaling model discussed below, which can help explain cross-sectional
and time-series variations in GP carried interest.
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Carried Interest and the Learning Model
The learning model has 5 key implications for GP compensation (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). First, the level carried interest should increase over time. In the first fund, the GP is
motivated to work hard even without high levels of carried interest in the hopes of establishing a
solid reputation and track record, which will in turn facilitate raising follow-on funds with higher
expected carried interest percentages. However, as the GPs reputation is established over time,
the GP will require more carried interest as an incentive to exert appropriate effort levels.
Second, the level of fixed fees over time is ambiguous; although the variable compensation
unambiguously should increase, fixed management fees can either increase, decrease, or remain
constant through time. Third, all else being equal, the level of fixed management fees should be
positively correlated with the effort level required to select, invest in, and monitor portfolio
firms.
The fourth implication of the learning model is that the variance in pay-for-performance
sensitivity should increase over time. In initial funds, when neither the GPs nor the investors
know the true abilities of the GPs, the carried interest percentage should be clustered across all
funds due to the lack of information. However, as fund performance information is gleaned by
investors and GP ability becomes known to both parties, the carried interest offered in
subsequent funds should vary according to the skill level of GPs. The fifth characteristic
predicted by the learning model is that the level of pay-for-performance sensitivity should not be
related to performance. This implication stems from the fact that in the first period, the GP is
still motivated to exert appropriate effort levels in the hopes of establishing a good reputation
even though the level of carry is not as high (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Carried Interest and the Signaling Model
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The different assumptions of the signaling model lead to different implications for GP
compensation than those purported by the learning model discussed earlier. First, the level of
carried interest will decrease over time. Thus, older and larger funds will be more likely to
demand higher fixed fees as a form of insurance as a trade-off for lower carried interest. Second,
the level of fixed management fees should increase over time as more experienced GPs require
more stable fees as a form of insurance. Third, the level of fixed fees should be positively
correlated with higher levels of effort required to invest and to monitor portfolio investments,
which is the same result predicted by the learning model (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Unlike the results predicted by the learning model, however, the signaling model predicts
that the variance of carried interest should decrease over time. This holds because more funds
are willing to accept riskier, variable pay to signal their different ability levels in initial funds,
while demanding less variable pay and more different levels of fixed pay in the second period,
once skill and ability is revealed to the investor.

Also different from the learning model

prediction is the signaling model’s prediction that the level of carried interest is positively
related to performance. This is because those firms that are willing to accept higher carried
interest in the first period are those with higher ability and skill and thus will also have better
fund performance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Empirical Model for Carried Interest
Empirical evidence from a sample of 419 venture capital partnerships whose first fund
closed between January 1978 and December 1992 supports the learning model framework
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999).

Gompers finds that the oldest and largest venture capital

partnerships are able to capture a 1% greater carried interest than less established funds. This is
consistent with the learning model prediction that the level of pay-for-performance sensitivity
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will increase over time as more established and reputable GPs will require higher carried interest
in order to be motivated to exert appropriate effort levels; at the same time, this finding is in
direct contrast to the signaling model prediction that the pay-for-performance sensitivity will
decrease over time as more reputable GPs demand more fixed management fees as a form of
insurance. Additional support for the learning model comes from Gompers’ empirical finding
that the variance of pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher for larger and older venture capital
funds. Thus, the signaling model prediction that carried interest variance will be higher for
younger funds seeking to signal their different ability levels is not borne out in practice. Exhibit
6 provides an overview of the key findings on carried interest models (Gompers and Lerner,
1999).
In order to explain variations in the most visible and dominant form of compensation for
GPs, the carried interest, Gompers conducts several regression analyses. The basic ordinary least
squares (OLS) models specified are the following (Gompers and Lerner 1999):

(1) Carried Interest % =

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Size

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Age

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for High-Tech

Focus)
(2) Carried Interest % =

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for Early Stage

Focus)

As Exhibit 6 shows, the coefficients on the size and age of the venture organization are positive
and significant at the 95% confidence level, indicating strong evidence of the learning model
over the signaling model.
Empirical Model for Management Fees
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In addition to carried interest, fixed management fees are also a significant portion of GP
compensation, especially when investments do not provide very attractive returns. Thus, the
carried interest regressions discussed above may be lacking to the extent that variations in carried
interest percentages may be due to underlying changes in the level of management fees charged
by the GP. Thus, Gompers also conducts univariate analyses and OLS regression analyses on
the level of management fees, with the following basic model specifications:

(1) NPV of Mgmt Fees =

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Size

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for High-Tech

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Age

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for High-Tech

Focus)
(2) NPV of Mgmt Fees =
Focus)

In both univariate and multivariate analyses, older and larger venture capital
organizations have been shown to be associated with lower levels of fixed management fees
relative to younger, smaller funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). This finding too is in support of
the learning model which predicts that larger and more reputable funds will require more
variable pay as incentive for GPs to work hard at the expense of lower fixed management fees; at
the same time, this finding contradicts the signaling model, which predicts that management fees
would be higher for older and larger venture capital organizations that demand more insurance
due to their superior reputation.
Empirical Model for Total Compensation Sensitivity
A more complete picture of GP compensation accounts for both the management fees and
carried interest given to the GP. Recognizing this, Gompers also runs regression analysis on the
sensitivity of total compensation (fixed and variable) to fund performance. This is done by
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measuring the difference in compensation given a one percentage increase in asset growth, from
20% to 21%. While additional assumptions are made regarding the risk levels of cash flows and
growth in the asset base, Gompers finds that older and larger funds exhibit significantly greater
compensation sensitivity to performance. Once again, this is telling evidence in favor of the
learning model, which predicts that more reputable GPs will need higher pay-for-performance
incentives to continue exerting proper effort levels.

Furthermore, Gompers finds that the

variance of performance sensitivity is significantly higher for larger and older venture capital
organizations, which corresponds with the predictions of the learning model.
Section 5.2: Preferred Return Provisions
Another key factor in the GP’s compensation scheme is the use of a preferred return
provision in the partnership agreement. While preferred returns are common in non-venture
partnership agreements, they represent a new and growing feature in venture capital settings. For
example, in a survey of 122 firms that managed private equity funds in 2000, Toll (2001) finds
that preferred returns were included in 90% of buyout funds, while the fraction of venture capital
funds with preferred returns was 35%, up from 19% in 1998” (Covitz and Liang, 2002). Since
preferred return provisions are becoming more prevalent in limited partnership agreements and
since they can alter significantly the GP’s level of compensation, their basic structure and the
specific instances in which they are used will be analyzed.
Since preferred returns can prove to be costly for GPs, the inclusion or exclusion of
preferred returns in partnership agreements is an important consideration when determining total
GP compensation. While there are various theories that explain the use of preferred return
provisions, this research will focus on two over-arching theories: the costly contracting theory
and the supply-demand theory.

It should be noted, however, that unlike the learning and
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signaling models, which lead to different predictions for compensation over time, the costly
contracting and supply-demand theories can both be at work simultaneously, and both theories
may help to explain the inclusion or exclusion of preferred return provisions in limited
partnership contracts.
Preferred Returns and the Costly Contracting Model
The Costly Contracting model tells us that the benefits of including preferred return
provisions into limited partnership agreements should be weighed against the costs of contracting
for that provision. If either the benefits of including preferred return provisions increases or if
the costs associated with contracting for the said provision decreases, this will increase the
likelihood of preferred return provisions being written into the partnership agreement. The
benefits associated with preferred returns include screening for GP quality, since less skilled GPs
may not be able to surpass the preferred return hurdle rate, and eliciting appropriate GP effort
levels because a higher portfolio value must be reached before they begin sharing in the profits
of the fund. On the other hand, the costs associated with preferred returns, above and beyond
contracting costs, include the fact that they may encourage risk-taking on the part of the GP, who
wishes to increase volatility to maximize the value of the call option (now with a higher strike
price) he holds on the firm’s capital.
The costly contracting hypothesis makes a variety of predictions regarding when
preferred return provisions would be most beneficial in limited partnership agreements. First, it
predicts that LPs investing in inexperienced funds will be more likely to use preferred returns;
this provision would serve as a screening mechanism because the potential for inexperienced
GPs to act opportunistically is high given their low reputational capital. Second, the costly
contracting hypothesis predicts that preferred returns would be more prevalent in less risky non-
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venture funds as opposed to venture funds where the distribution of returns is wider. Since
variance of returns is lower in non-venture funds, effort is more likely to be correlated with
performance and thus GPs would be more likely to be motivated by preferred returns when they
feel that their effort can have tangible results for their compensation. An extension of the costly
contracting hypothesis is the idea that some LPs will benefit from including preferred returns in
partnership agreements as a form of insurance to receive their invested capital and a preferred
return before GPs can share in the upside. Thus, the costly contracting hypothesis would predict
that as a form of compensation for this insurance, GPs will tend to receive more carried interest
from LPs when preferred returns are embedded into partnership agreements. This theory is
classified as the insurance hypothesis by Covitz and Liang (2002).
Preferred Returns and the Supply-Demand Model
Since preferred returns are a potential restraint on the GP’s compensation, it is viewed as
a cost to the GP. Thus, in times of high demand for experienced PE/VC services, we would
expect for GPs to gain relatively more bargaining power than LPs which would result in fewer
preferred return provisions in limited partnership agreements. The supply-demand theory also
makes predictions regarding the likelihood of preferred return provisions in various limited
partnership agreements. The fundamental prediction is that more experienced, reputable funds
will be in relatively more demand, and consequently the GPs of these more experienced funds
will have more contracting power than the LPs wishing to invest their capital.
Here, it should be noted that age and size of partnerships are generally positively
correlated with experience and reputation of the fund. For example, since PE/VC funds must
continually raise funds every 3-5 years, those that are able to continue raising funds will be those
that have had the most successful track records. Also, funds that are oversubscribed by investors
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may be able to raise more capital than funds that are in less demand by investors. Thus, both age
and size of fund is a proxy for reputation and experience. The supply-demand theory, then,
would suggest that older and larger PE/VC funds will be less likely to include preferred return
provisions in their partnership agreements with LPs.

In addition to less preferred return

provisions, the GPs would also be able to negotiate equal or greater carried interest due to their
greater bargaining power. Accordingly, inexperienced PE/VC funds would be predicted to have
more preferred return provisions as well as lower carried interest owing to the superior
bargaining power of the LPs in this case (Covitz and Liang, 2002).
Covitz and Liang (2002) analyze the use of preferred returns in private equity limited
partnership contracts to address four information asymmetries: 1) GP effort 2) level of risk 3)
talent and 4) the value of portfolio firms prior to exit. First, they argue that since preferred
returns only reward GPs for higher returns (i.e. once the hurdle rate is reached), and since effort
is generally positively correlated with returns, then the GPs will be more inclined to exert
appropriate effort levels when preferred returns are present. Second, Covitz and Liang (2002)
point out that the GP’s performance-based pay can be viewed as a fraction of a call option
(typically 20%) with the strike price equal to the committed capital and time to maturity equal to
the life of the fund. Thus, GPs are inclined to increase volatility in order to increase the value of
their option, and since a preferred return increases the strike price and brings the option more
out-of-the-money, the payoff for added risk would be even greater with preferred returns.
The third information problem addressed is that of unobservable GP quality, and Covitz
and Liang (2002) argue that preferred returns can be an effective screen for this, since less
talented GPs would be less likely to earn their carried interest when preferred returns are
specified. The fourth information asymmetry discussed centered on the GP’s private knowledge
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about the value of portfolio investments prior to their exit. Since LPs contribute most of the
capital and GPs compensation is highly leveraged, the GPs have an incentive to delay exiting
investments. However, preferred returns can mitigate this incentive to delay exits because GPs
only receive variable compensation when the portfolio value is greater than or equal to the point
when the GP catches up to the carried interest and this value increases with time when preferred
returns are contracted (due to annual compounding of the preferred return). In contrast, with no
preferred returns, the GP always receives a fixed amount of the profits as carried interest and
may benefit from delaying an exit. Refer to Exhibit 5 for an overview of the typical payoff
diagram for the GP under a preferred return provision.
Empirical Findings on Preferred Returns
Covitz and Liang (2002) put theory to empirical test through cross-sectional and timeseries studies as they hypothesize that variations in the use of preferred returns are caused by
differences in information between the GP and LP. Both the costly contracting theory and
supply-demand theory help to explain variations in the use of preferred returns in different
settings. First, they find support for the costly contracting theory by finding evidence that
preferred returns are more prevalent in less risky non-venture investments than in more risky
venture investments. This is because when return distributions are tighter, higher returns are a
better signal of higher GP effort, and consequently, LPs benefit from including preferred return
provisions since it will better motivate the GP to exert appropriate effort. Hence, 90% of buyout
funds compared to only 35% of venture capital funds used preferred returns. Second, Covitz and
Liang (2002) find evidence that preferred returns are more likely to be used in younger funds as
opposed to older funds. These findings are consistent with both the costly contracting theory and
the supply-demand theory since younger funds may also have less reputational capital, and
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therefore, these funds may be in less demand by investors. In addition, the preferred return can
be used as a screening mechanism to better identify skilled from non-skilled PE/VC
professionals.
While these findings help to broaden our understanding of the various compensation
features that comprise limited partnership agreements, it is important to note the limited scope of
Covitz and Liang’s findings. For instance, their research was unable to produce any convincing
evidence for the insurance hypothesis – that LPs require preferred returns as a form of insurance.
They attempted to test this by considering funds that had a majority of their capital contributed
by pension funds because pension fund managers’ compensation is based on meeting minimum
return requirements and does not feature much upside potential. However, this information is
difficult to gather and the data available did not produce robust results (Exhibit 7 gives an
overview of Covitz and Liang’s empirical findings).
In addition, Covitz and Liang (2002) were not able to solidify a definitive relationship
between preferred returns and carried interest.

As mentioned earlier, however, the carried

interest amount is fairly stable across most PE/VC funds at approximately 20%. Thus, the low
variation in carried interest may make it difficult to find a link with preferred return provisions.
However, total compensation is not only driven by carried interest, but can also be driven by the
use of covenants which act as a restraint on the time and resources of the GP. Thus, Covitz and
Liang’s empirical study may indeed be improved if they were to take a more complete view of
GP compensation and test for a relationship between preferred returns and covenants, which may
be more variable in nature.

The use of these varying restrictive covenants in partnership

agreements will be the focus of the next section.
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Section 5.3: Covenants
Since covenants and preferred return provisions, discussed earlier, share similar
characteristics, in that they are both costly for the GP and beneficial for the LP, similar theories
can help to explain when and why each will be used in partnership agreements. Gompers and
Lerner (1999) predict that the use of covenants is driven by the same two underlying forces that
were discussed in regards to preferred returns: the Costly Contracting model and the SupplyDemand model.
Covenants and the Costly Contracting Model
To review, the costly contracting model predicts that since negotiating partnership
agreements is a costly process, covenants will be included only to the extent that the benefits of
restricting GP behavior outweighs the costs associated with taking such actions. Thus, any
circumstance which decreases the costs associated with monitoring GP action or which increases
the benefits from restricting GP behavior will lead to more covenants contracted. The costly
contracting theory leads to a variety of hypotheses regarding the use of covenants in partnership
agreements.

For example, larger VC funds make more investments which disclose more

information, so they are easier to monitor and should include more covenants in their contracts.
In addition, reputable PE/VC funds may be less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior since
they have a lot of reputational capital to protect; thus, since the benefits of acting
opportunistically are reduced for these GPs, it is less likely for reputable PE/VC funds to have
restrictive covenants included in their contracts.

Similarly, the benefits of acting

opportunistically are reduced when the pay-for-performance sensitivity, or carried interest
percentage, is increased. Since the GP will suffer from shirking in these cases, covenants are
predicted to be negatively related to the carried interest charged by the GP.
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On the other hand, early-stage and high-tech focused VCs have more to gain from
opportunistic behavior because they have much better information about the prospects of a start
up fund than does the LP, and since there are increased benefits to LPs of limiting opportunistic
behavior, Gompers would predict more covenants to be used for early-stage VCs. At the same
time, however, it may be difficult to monitor the actions of GPs focusing on early-stage and
high-tech industries because of the lack of information available regarding the firms in which
they invest. Thus, the net result for the number of covenants to be included for these funds is
ambiguous. Over time, however, it is generally thought that the number of covenants will
increase as more LPs become aware of the PE/VC industries, the potential agency problems that
may arise, and the potential covenants that may help them to monitor and align the incentives of
the GPs with their own (i.e. the costs of contracting are significantly reduced).
Covenants and the Supply-Demand Model
In addition to the costs and benefits of contracting for covenants, Gompers and Lerner
(1999) assert that the relative supply and demand of venture capital services will affect the use of
covenants in long-term contracts. Specifically, as demand for VC increases, holding the shortterm supply of VC relatively constant, the cost of buying into limited partnership increases for
the LPs as the GPs gain more bargaining power (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Consequently, the
LPs must settle for fewer covenants in limited partnership contracts, which in turn increases the
total amount of benefits (monetary and non-monetary) given to the GP. Thus, Gompers and
Lerner (1999) predict that funds that are in heavy demand, those that are better performing,
older, and those that have higher amounts of carried interest due to their proven track record, will
have fewer covenants included in contracts.
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Also, from a macroeconomic perspective, those funds raised when capital flowing into
the PE/VC industries is increasing, relative to the existing pool of capital, should have fewer
covenants since capital inflow is a proxy for demand. Another proxy for the relative demand for
a PE/VC fund is whether or not investment managers or “gatekeepers” were involved with
helping to raise the funds. These “gatekeepers” often pool the capital from a variety of LPs and
thus have more bargaining power when dealing with GPs since they also reduce the costs of
fundraising greatly. However, those funds that are able to raise enough capital without the added
help of an investment manager are thought to be highly sought after and consequently should
feature less covenants in their contracts.
Empirical Evidence on the Use of Covenants
Through empirical studies and regression analyses, Gompers and Lerner (1999) attempt
to explain the variation in the total number of covenants and the different categories of covenants
used in limited partnership agreements. In order to do this, Gompers establishes four variables to
test for the costly contracting theory and four variables to test for the supply-demand theory.
These four variables are described in the chart below:
4 Variables focused on Supply-Demand Hypothesis:
1) Funds focused on early-stage investments (more scope of opportunistic behavior)
2) Funds focused on high-tech sectors (more scope of opportunistic behavior)
3) Fund size: larger fund size, the more potential agency costs; however, larger funds may be
raised by more reputable funds, so they may need less covenants because they are less likely to
engage in opportunistic behavior.
4) Pay Sensitivity: covenants should be positively related to pay sensitivity because LPs must
give up carry in order to include certain covenants.
4 Variables that measure Supply/Demand of experienced PE/VC services
1) Inflow of new capital into venture funds in the year the fund is established (1982-1986)
relative to existing capital is a proxy for demand for PE/VC services.
2) Presence of investment managers indicates more demand for VC services
3) Total compensation that venture capitalists receive
4) Age of Venture Organization is anticipated to be in greater demand
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Source: Gompers and Lerner (1999).
Through univariate analysis, Gompers was able to show that a statistically significant
relationship exists between the number of covenants and presence of an investment manager (+),
pay sensitivity (-), rate of growth of the venture pool in the year of the fund’s closing (-), total
compensation for the GP (-). In addition, Gompers conducts multiple regression analysis to
explain the variation in the number of covenants (dependent variable) in limited partnership
agreements. The basic regression specification is shown below:

(1) Number of Covenants =
4*(Venture

Pool Growth) +

+

1*(Early-Stage

5*(Investment

Focus) +

Manager) +

2*(Pay

6*(Age

Sensitivity) +

3*(Size

of Venture Fund) +

of Venture Org.)

Exhibit 8 summarizes Gompers’ key results for his empirical study on the use of
covenants. As seen through the exhibit, the support for variables measuring the supply-demand
theory yield more robust results than those variables representing the costly contracting
hypothesis.
Here, it should also be noted that there is statistical evidence favoring the supply-demand
variables over the costly-contracting variables. For example, Gompers and Lerner (1999) show
that the coefficients on the supply-demand variables are jointly different from zero proven by a
low p-value (0.000); however, the same cannot be said for the coefficients on the costly
contracting variables which have a joint p-value of .231. This gives further empirical support to
the supply-demand theory in explaining variations in the number of covenants in partnership
agreements (Gompers and Lerner 1999).
As a side note, Gompers continues his analysis by including first difference regressions
as well as using the number of covenants within each category of covenants (management of
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fund, activity of partners, and permissible types of investment) as dependent variables using
similar dependent variables that represent the costly contracting and supply-demand theories.
While the results of these additional regressions are important to the understanding of the use of
covenants in limited partnership agreements, the general regression specification shown above
will suffice for our discussion of covenants as an additional form of compensation in partnership
agreements. The final sections of this paper will discuss the interrelatedness of all three topics
related to limited partnership agreements that have been discussed above: the carried interest,
preferred returns, and covenants. Specifically, key areas will be highlighted where past literature
has failed to include the link between all three factors as components of total GP compensation.
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Section 6: Dynamic Model for Compensation
While the compensation structures of most private equity and venture capital partnerships
has remained relatively constant over time, with over 80% of funds featuring the standard
80/20% profit sharing rule, there are various other non-monetary factors that should be
considered when computing the total benefits received by PE/VC general partners. Specifically,
covenants, which limit the actions of the GPs, as well as preferred return provisions should also
be factored in when trying to explain variations in carried interest percentages across limited
partnership agreements.
However, the past theoretical and empirical studies on carried interest, preferred returns,
and covenants (discussed at length in earlier sections), do not take into account this more
complete view of total GP benefits, which is a function of carried interest, preferred returns, and
the use of covenants. Rather, by focusing on only one or two of the three components that
comprise total GP compensation, the regression results of earlier researchers may suffer from
omitted variable bias and may consequently yield biased estimates for key variables (Stock and
Watson, 2003). Creating a more broad regression framework, which accounts for the
interconnectedness of all three of the key compensation variables, will give a better and more
accurate understanding of when, how, and why GPs get compensated the way that they do.
In order to develop this dynamic regression framework, it will be helpful to review the
basic models, both univariate and OLS, derived to explain variations in each of the three key
compensation variables.
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1) Carried Interest

(a) Carried Interest % =

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Size

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for High-Tech Focus)

(b) Carried Interest % =

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

2*(Age

of Venture Organization) +

3*(Flag

for Early Stage Focus)

2) Preferred Returns
(a) (Preferred Returns, Size of Venture Organization)

=

+/-

(b) (Preferred Returns, Age of Venture Organization)

=

+/-

(c) (Preferred Returns, GP Carried Interest)

=

+/-

3) Covenants
Number of Covenants =
4*(Venture

Pool Growth) +

+

1*(Early-Stage
5*(Investment

Focus) +

Manager) +

2*(Pay
6*(Age

Sensitivity) +

3*(Size

of Venture Fund) +

of Venture Org.)

Section 6.1: Limitations on Past Research
One of the key shortcomings of the carried interest regression specifications above is
their failure to factor in preferred returns and covenants as independent variables. As discussed
previously, Gompers finds that both the learning model and signaling model have different
predictions for the level of GP carried interest over time. However, in addition to variables
testing for these two hypotheses, it may be helpful to add variables that represent the supplydemand and costly contracting theory that have been used to explain preferred returns and
covenant use in partnership agreements.

In addition, carried interest levels may be driven by

not only by the size and age of a fund, but also by the extent to which other limitations or
restraints are placed on the GP, such as preferred return provisions and covenants.
Since Covitz and Liang (2002) shows that preferred returns are negatively correlated to
larger and older PE/VC firms and since preferred returns may also be a trade-off for higher GP
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carried interest, preferred returns may represent an omitted variable in the carried interest
regression model (Covitz and Liang, 2002). Specifically, the definition of an omitted variable is
one that is correlated with one of the included independent variables and also helps to explain
variations in the dependent variable. Both of these conditions are satisfied by preferred returns,
and consequently, the point estimates and confidence intervals for the independent variables
included in the carried interest model developed by Gompers and Lerner (1999) will give
inaccurate and biased results. This clearly limits the model’s usefulness, and it could potentially
lead to inaccurate predictions regarding whether the learning or signaling model determines the
actual contracting behavior of GPs and LPs. This omitted variable bias could be mitigated by
including a dummy variable equal to 0 for no preferred returns and 1 for preferred returns into
the general carried interest model.
Similar to preferred returns, the exclusion of covenants from the carried interest model
may also lead to omitted variable bias. Specifically, Gompers and Lerner (1999) show that the
number of covenants included in partnership agreements is negatively related to reputational
factors and relative demand factors for PE/VC services, such as the included independent
variables of age and size of venture organization in Gompers’ carried interest model.
Additionally, covenants may be viewed as a restriction on the GP’s activities, and consequently,
a GP may be willing to trade-off a lower carried interest percentage in return for a reduction in
the number of covenants included in the final contract. Since covenants are negatively correlated
with the included regressors (representing the age and size of venture organization) and at the
same time key drivers of the carried interest percentage offered to GPs, they can pose an omitted
variable bias in an OLS framework. In order to get around this omitted variable bias, three
additional independent variables can be included into the carried interest regression model:
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1) a flag for Covenants Governing the Overall Management of Fund (N=0, Y=1)
2) a flag for Covenants Limiting the Activities of the GP (N=0, Y=1)
3) a flag for Covenants Limiting the Permissible types of Investments (N=0, Y=1)

The inclusion of these three variables will give a better understanding of the prevalence
of each category of covenants and their respective ability to help explain variations in the
dependent variable, the carried interest percentage.
Making the two adjustments described above, one for preferred returns and another from
covenants, we can develop a more robust regression model that may provide a better indication
of the various factors that go into determining GP compensation. Surely, omitting variables
correlated with the included independent variables and the dependent variable will provide
unreliable results. With these adjustments, our new “Dynamic Carried Interest Model” will look
like the following:
Dynamic Carried Interest Model
(1) Carried Interest % =
Focus) +

4*(Preferred

7*(Permissible

+

1*(Date

of Closing) +

Return Flag) +

2*(Size

5*(Overall

of Venture Organization) +

Mgmt Covenant) +

6*(Activity

3*(Flag

for High-Tech

of GP Covenant) +

Investments Covenant Flag)

Section 6.2: Discussion of Research
Unfortunately, due to the private nature of the PE/VC industries, which does not require
public financial filings of information regarding contract provisions and fund returns, it is
difficult to accumulate data on the various limited partnership agreements that are established.
Past researchers have relied on personal connections with various LPs (such as Pension Fund
Managers) as well as PE/VC professionals in order to gather proprietary information on the
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partnership agreements. The limited public information available on the industry is a key
limitation for research on the PE/VC industry going forward, and due to these information
problems, the dynamic regression model specified above was not tested empirically.
Even without being able to quantify the sign and magnitude of the different components
that factor into GP carried interest, however, conclusions can be drawn regarding past empirical
models and predictions can be made for future studies, if data were available. A key finding is
that carried interest should not be considered in isolation. Rather, the true economic relationship
should exist between the amount of carried interest, the use of preferred returns, and the number
of covenants embedded into partnership agreements. It is the purpose of the dynamic carried
interest model to specify the magnitude and sign of these relationships.
Total GP compensation is thus a function of all three of the factors mentioned above,
which may even be contracted for at the same time, or endogenously. Thus, rather than showing
causality one way or another, it might be the case that each of the three decision variables, or
components of compensation, are determined simultaneously during negotiations between the
GP and LP. Thus, the GP and LP would contract for carried interest, preferred returns, and
covenants all at the onset of the limited partnership agreement negotiations. However, regardless
of whether one form of compensation causes another form or whether all forms are determined
endogenously, the limitation of the basic carried interest regression model developed by
Gompers is still apparent. Namely, the exclusion of preferred returns and covenants from the
model can bias the coefficients on the other independent variables, leading to unreliable
conclusions and a faulty understanding of the true economics of limited partnership agreements.
Another approach to get around the potential endogeneity problem could be through the
use of instrumental variable regression. As noted above, the basic problem with Gompers and
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Lerner’s previous regression models was that the included regressors (age or size) may have
been correlated with the error term of the regression. To get around this, an instrumental
variable could be used to isolate that portion of the included regressor that is uncorrelated with
the error term. Then, these new values for the included regressor could be used to run a
regression with the independent variable, carried interest in our case. The problem, however, lies
in finding instrumental variables that are 1) relevant and correlated with the included regressors
and 2) exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term. Potential instruments such as size of a
PE/VC organizations office or number of PE/VC professionals working at the organization may
be correlated with size and age of the PE/VC fund (included regressors) and also uncorrelated
with the error term.

However, this methodology is limited to the extent that statistically

significant data exists on these variables.
Here it should be noted that just as the PE/VC organizations are highly specialized, so too
are the law firms that draft the limited partnership agreements. Thus, a particular law firm may
be highly specialized in drafting contracts with particular covenants or particular preferred return
provisions. The contracting activity, then, is determined by rules of thumb or by the law firm’s
past experience with drafting contracts. If certain PE/VC firms continually go to the same law
firms for help in drafting limited partnership agreements, then the law firm chosen may have a
significant impact on the nature of the contract and compensation terms for the GPs. This notion
that the choice of law firm may be an omitted variable from the carried interest regression model
leaves room for future research on the various law firms focused on the PE/VC industry.
Even though data is not available to test the true point estimates and confidence intervals
for the dynamic regression model for carried interest, we can still provide explanations for what
may be observed if the data were available. For example, if the coefficient on the Preferred
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Return Provisions Flag is positive and significant, this would imply that there is a substitution
effect or trade-off between carried interest and preferred return provision. In essence, the LPs
must pay or give up carried interest in order to include covenants. This result would indicate that
GPs may not have superior bargaining power over LPs because if they did, then they would be
able to negotiate both higher carried interest and lowered preferred returns. However, if the
coefficient on Preferred Return Provisions is negative, this could imply that the LP has superior
bargaining power and is able to negotiate both more covenants and lower carried interest
simultaneously.
In addition, we can consider the three coefficients on the covenant flags together to
determine the effect that covenants have on the amount of carried interest given to GPs. For
instance, if the coefficients on the three covenants flags are positive, then this may imply that
there is a substitution effect or trade-off between monetary compensation and non-monetary
restrictions on the GP’s actions. Thus, LPs must pay or give up more carried interest to GPs in
order to include restrictive covenants in partnership agreements. On the other hand, if the
coefficient on Number of Covenants is negative, this would suggest that LPs may have superior
bargaining power and are able to negotiate both more covenants and lower carried interest
simultaneously. Here it should also be noted that due to the inclusion of these additional
regressors, the original point estimates and confidence intervals for the other regressors, as well
as the overall fit of the model, may be altered significantly. Thus, prior conclusions drawn
regarding which theory is best at predicting compensation levels may be invalidated.
The implications of the new dynamic regression framework should provide new insights
into the contracting behaviors of both GPs and LPs. This will have important implications going
forward as the PE/VC industries continue to grow in the United States and abroad. This greater
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understanding of contracting mechanisms can help to mitigate potential adverse selection and
moral hazard problems, encouraging more LPs to invest in private equity and more GPs to raise
additional funds in the hopes of making attractive risk-adjusted returns. The nature and extent to
which limited partnership agreements and compensation structures evolve over time, however,
ultimately revolves around the successes and failures of current contracting mechanisms that
help to align the LP’s incentives with those of the GPs and those between the GPs and the
entrepreneur seeking venture funding.
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Exhibit 1: Overview of PE/VC Investing (Pension Funds)
Investors in the Private Equity Market
(Year-End 1996 in $US bn)
Total Outstanding: $176.3 bn
Co rpo rate
Pensio n Funds,
$ 34.7

Other, $ 16.0
Investment Banks,
$ 8.6
No n-Financial
Co rpo ratio ns,
$7.5
Insurance
Co mpanies, $ 12.7

Co mmercial
Banks, $19.3

Public Pensio n
Funds, $ 39.5

Individuals, $18.2
Endowments &
Fo undations,

Source: Fenn, Liang, Prowse. The Private Equity Market: An Overview. Pg. 71
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Exhibit 2: Overview of Growth of PE/VC Industry
Private Equity Capital Outstanding ($US bn)
Source of Funds
$200.0

Limited Partnership
Other

$150.0
$143.2
$100.0

$50.0
$33.2

$2.0
$2.7

$1980

1995

Private Equity Capital Outstanding ($US bn)
Type of Investment
$200.0

Venture
Non Venture

$44.3

$150.0

$100.0
$132.0
$50.0
$3.0
$1980

$1.7
1995

Source: Fenn, Liang, Prowse. The Private Equity Market: An Overview. Pg 3
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Exhibit 3: Overview of Key Players in PE/VC Industry

Investor
(Limited Partner)

Committed
Capital
Profits from
Investments

PE/VC Limited Partnership
(General Partner)

Portfolio
investments
Private Equity
Securities

Portfolio Firms
(Entrepreneur)

Source: Fenn, Liang, Prowse. The Private Equity Market: An Overview. Pg. 6.

50

Exhibit 4: Overview of Oversight Mechanisms for All Parties in PE/VC
Means of
Control

Means of
Control

•
•
•
•

Direct Control
Partnership Covenants
Advisory Boards
Performance Incentives
Reputation
GP Compensation

•
•
•
•

Direct Control
Voting Rights/Board Seats
Access to Capital
Performance Incentives
Managerial Ownership
Managerial Compensation

Source: Fenn, Liang, Prowse. The Private Equity Market: An Overview. Pg. 43
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Exhibit 5: Typical Payoff Diagrams for GP Compensation

Carried Interest
GP Carried Interest
as a % of LP Capital

Preferred Returns
GP Carried Interest
as a % of LP Capital

Slope = .20

Portfolio Value as % of LP
Capital

Slope = 1

Slope = .20

Portfolio Value as % of LP
Capital

Source: Covitz and Liang. Recent Developments in the Private Equity Market and the Role of Preferred Returns. Pg. 8.
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Exhibit 6: Empirical Evidence on Carried Interest %

21.4%

Carried Interest %

21.5%
21.0%
20.5%

20.7%
20.5%

20.6%

20.0%
No earlier
funds

Four years or Betw een four More than
less
and eight
eight years
years

(Age of Venture Organization)

Carried Interest %

22.0%

21.6%

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables

Carried Interest % Carried Interest %

Date of closing

0.04
(0.80)

Size of venture organization

50.67
(2.54)

Age of venture organization
Fund focuses on high tech?

0.07
(2.47)
0.93
(3.08)

Fund focuses on early stage?

0.75
(2.41)

21.5%
20.9%

21.0%
20.5%

20.4%

20.5%

20.0%
19.5%
No earlier
funds

Betw een 0.0 Betw een 0.2 Greater than
and 0.2
and 0.7
0.7 percent
percent
percent

-0.002
(0.03)

Constant

-58.52
(0.60)

23.53
(0.23)

Adjusted R-Squared
p-value
Number of Observations

0.03
0.002
416

0.02
0.016
416

(Capital in fund/Total capital)

Source: Gompers and Lerner. The Venture Capital Cycle. Pg. 65-69.
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Exhibit 7: Empirical Evidence on Preferred Return
s

Correlation

Sign

Reasoning

Supports

ρ(Preferred Return, Experience of Fund)

-

LPs use preferred returns as a screening mechanism or
because these funds are in more demand

Costly Contracting,
Supply-Demand

ρ(Preferred Return, Riskiness of Fund)

-

Preferred Returns used more often in less risky nonventure funds where effort is indicative of outcome;
tighter distribution of returns

Costly Contracting

ρ(Preferred Return, Carried Interest)

?

Inconclusive Data due to lack of variation in carried
interest

N/A

Source: Covitz and Liang. Recent Developments in the Private Equity Market and the Role of Preferred Returns. Pg. 23.
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Exhibit 8: Empirical Evidence on the Use of Covenants
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables

# of Covenants

Sign of
Costly Contracting Supply-Demand
Coefficient
Prediction
Prediction

Fund focuses on early stage?

0.19
(0.34)

+

+

Age of venture organization

-0.06
(1.11)

-

Size of venture organization

0.005
(1.45)

+

Venture pool growth

-5.06
(5.83)

-

-

Investment Manager?

1.47
(2.23)

+

+

Total compensation

-13.19
(1.33)

-

-

Sensitivity of pay to performance? (Carry)

-51.67
(1.63)

-

Constant

12.51
(2.85)

Adjusted R-Squared
Root MSE

0.22
2.658

+/-

+/-

-

-

Source: Gompers and Lerner. The Venture Capital Cycle. Pg. 49.
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